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waiver, in the context of a reorganization plan, serves as a benefit for parties involved in 
reorganization, and for the efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings overall. 
I. A Bankruptcy Court May Retain Post-Confirmation Jurisdictional Authority Over A 
Dispute Regarding the Implementation of the Plan. 
 
As a threshold issue, bankruptcy courts must ensure that they have the requisite subject 
matter jurisdiction over a post-confirmation dispute.3 Federal jurisdiction is authorized for 
bankruptcy proceedings under section 1334 of the United States Code.4 Section 1334(a) provides 
that “district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.5 
However, an exception in section 1334(b) states, “district courts shall have original but not 
exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to 
cases under title 11.”6 Courts have interpreted the phrase “related to” narrowly in an attempt to 
prevent the expansion of federal jurisdiction over matters best left to state courts.7 In chapter 11 
cases debtors restructure their debt through the approval of a plan of reorganization.8 Once the 
plan is confirmed, the purpose of a bankruptcy case is diminished.9 Yet once confirmed, there is 
no express statutory provision that provides for a change in the subject matter jurisdiction 
regarding the plan.10 As a result, courts have found that the subject matter jurisdiction of a 
bankruptcy court is “sharply reduced” after confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.11  
Despite the sharply reduced scope of jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts retain jurisdiction in 
order to prevent interference with the terms of a confirmed plan and to otherwise aid in the 
                                               




7 In re Kmart Corp., 359 B.R. 189, 194 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (citing Home Ins. Co. v. Cooper & Cooper, Ltd., 889 
F.2d 746, 749); see also, Matter of FedPack Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 213-214 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[P]recedents hold 
that a case is related to a bankruptcy when the dispute affects the amount of property for distribution or the 
allocation of property among creditors.”)(internal quotations omitted). 
8 In re Kmart Corp., 359 B.R. at 195. 
9 The purpose being “dealing efficiently and expeditiously with all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate[.]” 
In re Kmart Corp., 359 B.R. at 195. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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plan’s operation.12 In order to determine whether a bankruptcy court has post-confirmation 
jurisdiction, the court must find that (1) the matter has a close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or 
proceeding and that (2) the plan provides for the retention of jurisdiction over the dispute.13  
A. Determining a Close Nexus. 
In order to determine whether a close nexus exists courts look to (1) “whether 
adjudication will require interpretation of the chapter 11 plan,” (2) “whether it will affect the 
estate or reorganized debtor,” and (3) "whether adjudication will interfere with the 
implementation of the chapter 11 plan.”14 In In re Ventilex, the court found a close nexus existed 
between the plan of reorganization and the relief requested in a motion in a civil action.15 The 
court determined that the motion requested an interpretation of the plan, because it “relate[d] to 
the preservation of [the party’s] claims, rights, and remedies.”16 The court noted that (regarding 
the other requirements) neither party involved indicated how adjudication would affect the 
estate, or whether adjudication would interfere with the actual implementation of the plan.17 
Regardless, the court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the first of the three 
requirements, interpretation of the plan, was satisfied. 18 
Along similar lines, a court would likely find that a close nexus existed between a plan of 
reorganization and whether a debtor in that plan implicitly waived its rights under that plan. This 
is because determination of whether a debtor waived its rights under the reorganization plan 
necessitates an interpretation of the chapter 11 plan to determine the rights of the debtor. The 
determination would also affect the reorganized debtor, as it would lose a right provided by that 
                                               
12 Id. (citing In re Cary Metal Products, Inc., 152 B.R. 927, 932 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993)). 
13 See In re Park Ave. Radiologists, P.C., 450 B.R. 461, 466 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also, In re Ventilex, 509 
B.R. at 143. 
14 In re Ventilex, 509 B.R. at 143. 
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reorganized plan, and the determination that a debtor has waived a particular right under said 
plan, would interfere with the implementation of the plan, as it would limit the debtor’s options 
under the plan, or potentially expand the rights of a creditor.  
B. Specific Authorization within the Reorganization Plan. 
The second consideration in determining whether a bankruptcy court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over a post-confirmation dispute is whether the plan provides for the retention of 
jurisdiction over the dispute.19 Provided that the plan of reorganization provides for the retention 
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court could then continue its inquiry for an implied 
waiver under a reorganization plan. 
II. A Debtor in a Reorganization Plan May Waive Its Rights Provided Under that Plan. 
 
After meeting the threshold question of whether a bankruptcy court has the jurisdictional 
authority in a post-confirmation proceeding, the remaining issue is whether a debtor can 
implicitly waive its rights under a confirmed chapter 11 plan. Since reorganization plans are 
treated much like a contract between parties, courts have found that debtors can waive their 
rights provided for them under a plan.  
A. “A confirmed plan of reorganization is in effect a contract between the parties.”20 
 
Courts treat a confirmed plan of reorganization as a contract between the parties, the 
terms of which describe the rights and obligations of each party involved.21 The plan, once 
confirmed, binds the debtor and any other interested parties to the plan’s rights and obligations.22  
                                               
19 See In re Ventilex, 509 B.R. at 143; see e.g., Ernst & Young LLP v. Baker O'Neal Holdings, Inc., 304 F.3d 753, 
756 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he terms of the plan could have called for the bankruptcy court to retain jurisdiction over a 
dispute while its merits are arbitrated, the terms of this plan specifically called for the bankruptcy court to retain 
jurisdiction to adjudicate such disputes.”). 
20 Ernst & Young LLP, 304 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2002).  
21 Id.; see also, In re Airadigm Communications, Inc., 616 F.3d 642, 664 (7th Cir. 2010). 
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a); see also In re Castle Home Builders Inc., 520 B.R. 98, 106 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). 
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A court may treat a confirmed plan as a contract, provided that adequate notice and due 
process are awarded to the parties.23 Any creditor that fails to object to the plan provisions during 
the confirmation process cannot later challenge its terms.24 In In re Castle Home Builders, the 
court stated that the reorganization plan expressly laid out responsibilities of the reorganized 
debtor, and the creditor did not object, thus confirming the plan.25 The court went further to say 
that it had the authority to make certain determinations that were consistent with the parties’ 
apparent intentions when negotiating the terms of the plan, and were in furtherance of the 
implementation of the plan.26 Given the courts authority and its view of a confirmed 
reorganization plan as a contract between parties, it is likely to be within the court’s discretion to 
find that a debtor implicitly waived its rights under a reorganization plan.  
B. A party may implicitly waive its rights under a contract. 
In order to find that a debtor implicitly waived its rights under its confirmed plan, the 
court must first determine that the debtor voluntarily and intentionally relinquished its known 
rights.27 When a court looks to find an implicit waiver of a known right, the intention must be 
shown through “a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act.”28 An implied waiver arises where the 
party against whom the waiver is asserted acts inconsistent with any other intention than to 
waive the right.29 The burden of proof for an implied waiver falls on the party claiming the 
waiver.30  
                                               
23 In re Castle Home Builders Inc., 520 B.R. at 106. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 107. 
27 Anderson v. Holy See, 878 F. Supp. 2d 923, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (applying Illinois law), aff'd sub nom., Anderson 
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 759 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2014); see also, Voest-Alpine Intern. Corp. v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A., 707 F2d 680, 685 (2d Cir. 1983) (“To establish waiver under New York law one must show 
that the party charged with waiver relinquished a right with both knowledge of the existence of the right and an 
intention to relinquish it.”). 
28 Anderson, 759 F.3d 645 at 651. 
29 Kane v. Am. Nat. Bank & Tr. Co., 316 N.E. 2d 177, 182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974). 
30 Id. 
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A court will find that a debtor’s repeated silence and disregard of a creditor’s attempts to 
contact the debtor in order to execute the sale of property dictated by the confirmed plan of 
reorganization would constitute an implied waiver of that debtor’s right to purchase said 
property.31 The debtor, having multiple opportunities to respond to and negotiate the purchase of 
said property, made a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of non-responsiveness.32 The debtor, 
being the party against whom the waiver is being asserted, acted inconsistent with any other 
intention other than to waive its right to purchase the property according to its plan.33  
Conclusion 
 A court can determine that a debtor implicitly waived its rights provided for under its 
chapter 11 plan of reorganization. In making that determination on a post-confirmation plan, the 
court must first satisfy the threshold question of authority through a finding that a debtor’s 
implied waiver of a right within the reorganization plan has a close nexus to the plan, and that 
the plan contained a specific authorization of the bankruptcy court to retain jurisdictional 
authority. Neither of these questions presents much of a barrier for a bankruptcy court when 
addressing whether a debtor implicitly waived its right.  
 Once the threshold question is satisfied the court need only determine that the debtor 
voluntarily and intentionally relinquished a known right under the plan through clear, 
unequivocal, and decisive acts. Permitting courts to make findings of implicit waivers is an 
effective way to ensure that both debtors and creditors will remain vigilant in understanding the 
rights and obligations they have under their plan of reorganization. Additionally, allowing 
waivers provides an efficient result for creditors, or debtors, that are bound to a purchase 
agreement when one party is consistently nonresponsive to attempts to complete the transaction.  
                                               
31 In re Parkland Properties, LLC, 605 B.R. 509, 520 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2019). 
32 Id. at 522. 
33 Id. 
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